This chapter explores the national drivers for climate ambition and climate action. It looks at the array of reasons why communities, businesses, city, district and national governments are compelled to act on climate change – and at the hurdles to doing so. How are actors making the case for climate action and overcoming those challenges? How are they overcoming resistance to change?

Many aspects of a country’s human and physical geography and political landscape provide the impetus for climate compatible development policies. These key drivers include:

• the recognition of the need to reduce poverty, particularly extreme poverty, and the recognition that ending poverty and action on climate change are completely interconnected
• a recognised need to achieve sustained economic growth, which will be hampered by the overstepping of Earth’s natural limits if it is not environmentally sustainable
• the need to bolster climate resilience – awareness may become acute when a country suffers climate-related extremes or disasters (see box)
• a concern about energy security
• a desire to capitalise on new economic opportunities
• a desire to capitalise on climate finance and aid
• a desire to act as leaders on climate compatible development in the international arena (for more, see Chapter 7).

The hurdles to winning the argument for climate compatible development can be significant. Like development more broadly, climate compatible development can be contested territory. There are no one-size-fits-all approaches. Rather, navigating the specific approach is a place-by-place and country-by-country affair.

However, proponents of action on climate change do face some common challenges:

• Interest groups are opposed to change.
• There is often a lack of awareness and lack of trusted information about what the future climate holds and what scientific projections mean.
• There are real and perceived costs associated with change, and risks, opportunities and trade-offs to be navigated.
• Decision-makers and influential stakeholders may prioritise more expedient, short-term issues.

This chapter suggests ways of framing the issues and building alliances to marshal political, social and financial support for climate compatible development solutions.

First, a compelling narrative is needed, around the costs of failing to deal with climate change. The conversation about the costs of failing to cut greenhouse gases is, naturally, a global conversation, because emissions released in one place affect us all. In the climate-vulnerable and least developed countries where CDKN has worked, per capita emissions are well below global averages and so the national and subnational conversation about ‘action on climate change’ often starts with the case for investing in climate change adaptation and building resilience.

In Nepal, an exercise to calculate the cost of climate change impacts over the next few decades has provided a focus – previously lacking – for the different ministries of national government to engage in the climate debate, assess implications for their sectors, and develop more climate-resilient interventions. Nepal is a predominantly rural society, where 70% of the population relies on farming for income. Recent temperature rises and reduction in winter rainfall are affecting productivity and the livelihoods of the most vulnerable populations. The CDKN-supported study, Economic impact assessments of climate change in Nepal, identified agriculture as highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. It found that 2-3% of the country’s GDP will be lost by 2050 as a result of climate change. This was a wake-up call for government to support new farming practices that would increase farmers’ resilience to climate change.

The case for taking action is a convincing one because the economics line up: many of the options for adapting to climate change are ‘no regret’ or ‘low regret’ options. That is, they make development sense and would cost little or no more than programmes the government would support anyway. The Government of Nepal is investing in a programme to scale up these practices and CDKN is advising the government on how to build the capacity of local researchers and farm workers.

[This study] has helped sensitise all of us to the challenges and way forward associated with climate change impacts and has helped build the capacity of the scientific community in Nepal.

Dr Krishna Chandra Paudel, Secretary, Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment Government of Nepal

In Uganda, the National Development Plan (2010/11-2014/15) recognises that climate change will affect most of the country’s economic sectors. The plan acknowledges that addressing climate change is crucial if the country is to achieve sustainable economic and social development, and the Vision 2040 goal of transforming Uganda to a competitive, upper-middle-income country. At the time of writing, the national government is in a process of evaluating how to further strengthen low-emission and climate-resilient measures into the country’s next national development plan.

The impacts of climate change are expected to be felt across all sectors of Uganda’s economy in the coming years. In the next 50 years, average temperatures are expected to rise about 2°C and rainfall is expected to decrease slightly across most of the country – most significantly over Lake Victoria, with slightly wetter conditions in the west and north-west.

CDKN-commissioned research on the future impacts of climate change in Uganda and the cost of inaction found that:

• The cost of adaptation is high – estimated at around US$406 million over the next five years. On an annual basis, this amounts to about 5% of net official assistance received and 3.2% of total government revenues (excluding grants).
• However, the cost of inaction is far greater, estimated at around US$3.1–5.9 billion a year by 2025 – between 24 and 46 times greater than the proposed adaptation budget. (These costs combine current climate variability and future climate change, so some of the costs will occur regardless of climate change impacts.)
• The economic case for adaptation is clear. Most of the adaptation measures proposed in the study are ‘no regrets’ investments, in that they are valid even in the absence of climate change.

Second, a compelling narrative on the benefits of climate action is essential for overcoming political resistance and successfully making the case for climate compatible development policies. For climate mitigation in particular, where the benefits of immediate action to curb or avoid greenhouse gas emissions will not manifest themselves for several decades, the case must be made on the development benefits of low-emission actions today.

As you will read in the ‘Regional Insights’ linked on the side of this page, in those cases where action on climate change mitigation and adaptation has been meaningful, ambitious and has truly gained traction at national level, it has been firmly embedded in a country’s development vision and strategy – at a macroeconomic and cross-sectoral level. Carl Wesselink talks about how the Rwandan and Ethiopian governments have done exactly this.

You can’t go into Africa talking first about climate change, you have to talk about development. Poverty and inequality must be tackled now, so the question is, what are the lowest-emission and most climate-resilient means possible to do so?

Shehnaaz Moosa, CDKN’s Africa operations manager

Of course, each individual country’s circumstances are unique and the parameters in which a national narrative for climate compatible development can be constructed are, likewise, unique. Far-sighted political leaders recognise, articulate and respond to a new development story, a climate compatible development story “characterised by changing patterns of innovation, production and trade tied to climate responses and to financial, disaster, conflict and climate risks and uncertainties at an unprecedented level”. Again, the ‘Regional Insights’ essays provide examples of such narratives, as does the box (below) on China’s leadership in renewable energy, below. Here are glimmers of an emergent paradigm, by which a country’s overall economic growth prospects and competiveness in the global economy may be defined by its ability to offer ‘clean’ and ‘green’ products and services and manage climate change-related risks.

The term ‘co-benefits’ has become increasingly common, particularly with regard to interventions at project, programme or sector level. Discussion of ‘co-benefits’ reflects the fact that action on climate change produces many other benefits, not directly related to the climate. For example, action to reduce traffic congestion can have major benefits in terms of air quality, which in turn benefits public health. Identifying and quantifying the co-benefits can strengthen the overall case for climate action. A two-year expert assessment, Green growth in practice: Lessons from country experiences presents countries’ practical experience in delivering jobs, economic growth, export revenue, income diversification, energy access, improved public health and more resilient infrastructure and cities, as a result of climate compatible development policies.

An excellent example of ‘co-benefits’ comes from Tanzania, where the government supported a Small Power Projects programme – with limited financial resources – to enable the expansion of decentralised renewable energy, such as solar photovoltaic installation. The CDKN Inside Story Achieving development goals with renewable energy – the case of Tanzania, describes how these renewable energy solutions are contributing to Tanzania’s climate compatible development by: supporting economic development through improved access to reliable electricity; lessening vulnerability to fossil fuel price shocks and to drought-related hydropower shortages; and also reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Now a significant scaling up of Tanzania’s renewable energy infrastructure is being supported by the Climate Investment Funds – as it has become a pilot country for the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) in Low Income Countries. Many further examples of co-benefits are explored under the sectoral entry points for planning climate compatible development in Chapter 3.

Economic and social benefits alone would make many low-carbon policies and approaches worth pursuing.

New Climate Economy - Seizing the global opportunity (2015, page 12)

Strong political leadership is a minimum, essential requirement for making the case for, and progressing, climate compatible development. The initial phase of the Future Climate for Africa programme, for example, concludes that “the prominence of climate change in, and the uptake of climate information into, national planning and decision-making in sub-Saharan Africa, is dependent on three interrelated areas of political economy: i) support from powerful actors and stakeholders; ii) the structure of governance arrangements and institutional incentives; and iii) the ability to take advantage of appropriate windows of opportunity.” Jones et al. find that action on climate change within national policy and programming in sub-Saharan Africa has mostly been coordinated through ministries of environment and natural resources management, or their equivalents, which is suboptimal as these ministries are “often weak and under-resourced.”

In Rwanda, President Paul Kagame has championed the integration of climate action into all areas of national development, pioneering a National strategy on climate change and low-carbon development for Rwanda. Jones et al. add that “President Kagame’s enthusiasm has also facilitated a strong role for senior – and therefore powerful – ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning”. A learning paper by authors in Rwanda’s Environment Secretariat together with CDKN and the University of Wolverhampton tells the story at greater length, as does a CDKN-commissioned film Rwanda: Emerging in a changing climate.

In Peru, climate change became a leading issue in national politics thanks to the impetus lent by the then Minister of Environment, Manuel Pulgar Vidal, who established the Planning for Climate Change (PlanCC) project. PlanCC has been designed by public, private and non-governmental institutions under the leadership of a public steering committee and also involves the Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Centre for Strategic Planning. PlanCC seeks to develop sound evidence about possible climate change mitigation scenarios in Peru, strengthen capacities and lay the foundations for long-term low-carbon economic growth. Since the initiative started in 2013, Peru has compiled the necessary evidence to plan for climate compatible development and to prepare an (Intended) Nationally Determined Contribution to the UNFCCC with significant domestic support (this paper in Spanish provides detail).

In one ‘small but beautiful’ example which may inspire other governments, Barbados’s solar water heater industry has been very successful. It boasts over 50,000 installations that have saved consumers as much as US$137 million since the early 1970s. The Government of Barbados has created a framework to support the development of solar water heaters and ensure long-term fiscal and regulatory certainty for manufacturers and customers. The technology saves an estimated US$11.5-16 million per year for consumers. Analysts credit a major factor in the promotion and sustained uptake of the scheme to the leadership role of the prime minister, who visibly embraced solar water heating and communicated his support widely in the press.

Champions inside government need champions outside, too. They must build broad alliances with non-governmental actors – identifying and partnering with the constituencies that will benefit from climate mitigation and adaptation in the short and long term (and ensure interventions are soundly designed to yield short- as well as long-term benefits). “Make industries and regions benefit from the change – identify interest groups that are against you and make them benefit from the change,” Stephan Hallegatte of the World Bank has said at a recent ODI event to introduce his Three steps to decarbonizing development for a zero-carbon future report.

The following descriptions show just how complex it can become to identify and engage with the different groups that are affected by, or consider they have an interest in, climate-related policy. These interest groups may include global actors as well as local and national ones.

The first example is the contentious issue of fossil fuel subsidies, the worldwide phenomenon worth a staggering US$1.9 trillion globally – the equivalent of 2.5% of global GDP, or 8% of government revenues, according to a 2013 IMF report. Shelagh Whitley has demonstrated how removing such polluting subsidies needs extremely careful handling (Time to change the game: Fossil fuel subsidies and climate). She notes that fuel subsidies have originated for a variety of reasons, such as providing social support for lower-income households to access energy, or as a form of indirect subsidy for certain productive sectors of the economy; therefore, “The barriers to reporting on subsidies and to their removal are based on the multiple and often diverging interests of a wide range of stakeholders in both developed and developing countries. These include government officials, industry associations, companies, trade unions, consumers, social and labour political activists, and civil society organisations – all of whom need to be on board if subsidies are to be eliminated. Those pushing for the phase-out of subsidies must therefore harness the support of a wide variety of actors.”

CDKN-commissioned research on the political economy of climate compatible development provides other examples of the complexity of socioeconomic gains and losses among groups in any local or national context. One of the case studies examines Ghana’s marine fisheries as a microcosm of climate compatible development possibilities. It sheds light on the fears, insecurities and risks that can threaten local people if decision-makers adopt a pro-climate policy without providing sufficient, tangible support to affected stakeholders – and communicating the process for managing change.

In the coastal fisheries, there are two environmentally unsustainable and polluting activities – tackling them could address greenhouse gas emissions. First, fishermen use a polluting premix fuel (a mixture of petrol and oil for two-stroke engines), and the government currently subsidises artisanal fishermen’s use of the fuel. Second, mangroves are being cut unsustainably and lack effective government protection; as a result, they emit more greenhouse gases than they absorb (the destruction of coastal mangroves also increases the vulnerability of coastal Ghana to storm surges, which could become more frequent with climate change). Both issues are tangled in a “complex political economy” which makes it difficult to navigate solutions. The authors find that

“there is theoretical scope for a ‘triple-win’ outcome by removing the subsidy to reduce incentives to unsustainable fishing and supporting alternative policies [but] in practice this is highly problematic. Artisanal fishermen strongly oppose removing the subsidy on the grounds that it would damage their livelihoods, and do not have the confidence that they would be appropriately compensated for any hypothetical reform. Moreover, it is argued that removing it could have negative unintended consequences if fishermen are forced into alternative livelihoods that are themselves unsustainable. Meanwhile, although improved mangrove protection could have significant ‘triple-win’ benefits, this area suffers from a lack of funding and administrative coordination across ministries and agencies, leading it to be neglected.”

Tanner’s case study reveals that there are robust policy options that would move coastal Ghana toward more climate compatible development, but the major constraint to doing so is institutional failing. Different interest groups, including the most economically vulnerable, may “demand short-term improvements to current problems rather than aspiring to triple win outcomes in the long term, creating a major challenge for climate compatible development.” What does this imply for decision-makers? There is a need for robust institutional processes that enable stakeholders to appraise the problems together, and come up with a menu of options for action together. We analyse such multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder planning processes in the next chapter.

Leaders in the executive part of government must also build alliances with those in the legislative part. The importance of building alliances across different branches of government is explored in greater detail in the next chapter.

Without question, the impacts of climate change are already creating losers in society – and some of these losers are documented in detailed technical loss and damage research supported by CDKN.

However, climate compatible development policies will also be perceived as creating some losers, especially in the short term. As the New climate economy report states: “The shift towards a low-carbon, climate-resilient path of growth and development will not be easy, and governments will need to commit to a just transition. Not all climate policies are win-win, and some trade-offs are inevitable, particularly in the short term. Although many jobs will be created, and there will be larger markets and profits for many businesses, some jobs will also be lost, particularly in high-carbon sectors. The human and economic costs of the transition should be managed through support for displaced workers, affected communities and low-income households. Strong political leadership and the active participation of civil society will be needed, along with far-sighted, enlightened business decisions.”

Simon Maxwell also picks up this point, foreseeing that “Adjustment [towards green growth pathways] is likely to be disruptive, with winners and losers as between sectors, geographies, genders and generations … a focus on mitigation and adaptation alone is unlikely to encompass the range of likely effects” (Ten propositions on climate change and growth). Therefore, “some kind of national strategy is necessary to manage change on the scale expected.”

Intermediary organisations and individuals who tailor knowledge to make it more accessible and usable for others, can play a critical role in deepening actors’ understanding of climate impacts and solutions, so empowering them to act. Such ‘knowledge brokers’ can create bridges between the languages of science and climate-impacted communities and policy-makers.

There is a range of knowledge problems. Actors with a stake in climate action may simply be unaware of climate trends and prospects and the range of climate compatible development solutions. Or they may be aware of the issues and completely overwhelmed by the volume of information, and may need guidance on how to find information that is most relevant to them.

The Climate Knowledge Brokers (CKB) Group defines the knowledge broker’s role as interpreting, sorting, translating and integrating this wealth of information, and tailoring it to the needs of different audiences – from government decision-makers and industry chiefs to consumers and voters. The CKB Group is composed of more than 100 organisations and has a mission to make sense of the increasing ‘ocean’ of climate information so that people are well informed to act on climate-related risks.

“Only now are we really grasping the full extent to which our lives, our jobs and our environment are being altered by a changing climate”, said Florian Bauer, Chief Operations Officer at the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) at the launch of the Climate Knowledge Brokers Manifesto in September 2015. “To improve our resilience in the face of these changes, we need more effective decision-making in practically all sectors and at all levels. And the people charged with making decisions need the best available information and knowledge to do their jobs well.”

The scoping phase of the Future Climate for Africa programme (2013-2014) used case studies to explore whether and to what extent climate information is being used to inform decision-making in Africa. These comprised four country case studies (Malawi, Rwanda, Zambia and a combined study of Accra, Ghana and Maputo, Mozambique) and two desk-based studies focused on long-lived infrastructure in the ports and large hydropower sectors. The final report, Promoting the use of climate information to achieve long-term development objectives in sub-Saharan Africa, concludes that, in many cases, scientists are not producing the right type of information for people who need to make investment decisions. Even when they do, there is a pressing need for intermediaries or ‘knowledge brokers’ who can help decision-makers to understand the limits of the information and how it can usefully guide the decision-making process:

“Embedding climate information into important development decisions often boils down to creating the right ‘sales pitch’: promoting the usefulness of climate information [to decision-makers]. A sales pitch could demonstrate how climate information will increase decision-makers’ understanding of how certain long-term investments will affect their country’s economic growth, productivity, and the protection and creation of livelihood opportunities.”

The authors also add that there is a generic need “to help decision-makers understand what climate information should and should not be used for, and to encourage more systematic and evidence-based approaches to decision-making under uncertainty.

CDKN itself plays a role as knowledge broker in making climate information more accessible. Its work to create a range of guides, presentation packs and infographics to communicate the science of the IPCC has catalysed new forms of education, awareness raising, media work and policy debate in developing countries, as captured by an independent review (see Box).

Much as the role of the climate knowledge broker can be vital, and is highlighted in these examples, there are also risks that the mass media and individual communicators can misconstrue or misrepresent climate information, by accident or design. A study by Pegasys for the Future Climate for Africa programme, The political economy of long-lived decisions in Africa, cautions that climate programme managers “should be mindful of the role of communicators and approaches to disseminating knowledge … It is important to consider who is communicating as well as what is being communicated. The role of ‘science-policy intermediaries and ‘trusted messengers’ needs to be explored and appropriate approaches identified that show practical benefits.”